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# **SECURITY**

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(11) 11 Aug. '51 RD  
(12) 48 p. ,

~~2d-Lad (C)~~

[REDACTED] Lessons Learned, [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] (Headquarters, 5th [REDACTED])  
 [REDACTED] 1st [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 RMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 JAN 1967

17 JAN 1967

for Force Development, Department of the  
20310 (9) Operational out for quarterly  
period ending 31 Jul 66.

- AD393836

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4. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section I: The Star Light Scope, FSN 1090-688-9954 has been declared a critical item by Commanding General, USARV, with distribution of assets under the direct management of HQ USARV. The priority of distribution of the scope to Special Forces units is determined by CG USARV. (19)

OT-RD-660556

*G. L. McMullin*  
G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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GROUP-OF (10 Aug 66)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RMS COVER-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

17 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters concurs in the basic report as indicated.
2. (U) Reference Paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement: The HMMV was returned to HMMV on 1 November for preparation of Section XII, Equipment.
3. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section 1:
  - a. The unsatisfactory operation of the Army standard air cooled generator for counterbattery use reported to this Headquarters by Specific Mobility Service Office (SMSO), Chino, CA, and this Headquarters and HMMV that the failure was due to the requirements for reducing the noise level and that the generators were either overhauled or placed in buried CHMMV boxes. In either case, insufficient cooling is suspected as the contributing cause of failure and similar operating conditions will lead to early failure of the liquid cooled engine.
  - b. Since the air cooled generator is the standard generator in the Army supply system for 100W and below, cooling from the Air Force was necessary to obtain the liquid cooled models.
4. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section 1: The Star Light Scope, FM 100-600-90A has been declared a critical item by Commanding General, HMMV, with distribution of assets under M.1. direct assignment of HQ HMMV. The priority of distribution of the scope to Special Forces units is determined by GS HMMV.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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
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# 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1st SPECIAL FORCES

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FOR INFORMATION ONLY  
GROUP 1, SPECIAL FORCES  
GROUP 1, SPECIAL FORCES  
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INCLOSURES TO OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1))

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5. Personnel and Administration (S-1)
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7. Air Support (Air Movement)
8. Medical (Surgeon)
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HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSCPO -28  
(R1)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

THRU:

THRU:

TO:

Section I. Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

GENERAL:

During the reporting period Viet Cong forces did not initiate large scale assaults against any Special Forces camps, but numerous probes were launched against Forward Operating Bases. Rapid reaction by flareships, FAC, and airstrikes were decisive factors in our favor in most cases. The Viet Cong have shown great reluctance to become decisively engaged. Heavy losses have been inflicted on Viet Cong logistical bases. Tons of medical supplies, arms and ammunition have been captured and destroyed during the last ninety days. These losses, coupled with the flexible reaction capability of airmobile US forces, have prevented the Viet Cong from massing large units. CIDG forces are cooperating with FVMAF forces in I, II, and III Corps. They provide blocking forces, screen the flanks of FVMAF units, and obtain intelligence through the technique of saturation patrolling. The platoon size patrol has proven to be the most effective size unit for medium and long range operations in search of the Viet Cong. Though company size operations are effective when the VC position is known and when operating in conjunction with FVMAF units, the platoon provides a balanced capability for reconnaissance and combat if necessary. CIDG forces obtained a favorable kill ratio and a

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favorable weapons loss ratio during this reporting period. Three AN/PPS-5 radar sets, with operators, were deployed to camps Dak Pek and Duc Co in II Corps, and Camp Cai Cai in IV Corps. Excellent results were recorded from the set at Cai Cai. Large troop movements were monitored in Cambodia, and several squad size probes around the perimeter of the camp were detected prematurely. Detachment B-52 (Project Delta) was heavily committed in support of US units during the last 90 days. In addition to operational commitments, Long Range Recon Patrol training was conducted for members of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Division. The first CIDG camp to be opened inside a War Zone was Camp Trai Bi in III Corps. Located 10 km inside War Zone "C", this camp has made numerous contacts with the Viet Cong. The camp was subjected to an artillery (70mm Pack Howitzer) and mortar barrage on 23 July. Damage was not extensive and casualties were light. The VC did not follow up the shelling with an assault. Intelligence reports indicate a significant VC force in the camp's TAOR.

## 2. Intelligence.

a. In order to improve the intelligence response at CTZ level, 5th Special Forces Group intends to augment each C Detachment with an Information Analysis Center. The Information Analysis Center (IAC) is a functional intelligence organization within the S2 section of an operational C Detachment. It is formed to receive, process, analyze and exploit information which is available at the C Detachment level, with the specific purpose of returning the information in usable form to the subordinate B and A Detachments. The IAC receives information from several sources. The primary source is provided by subordinate units, to include USSF/LLDB A and B Detachments in the field. Secondary sources are adjacent and higher headquarters, to include US advised RVN units, Free World Military Forces, special military intelligence collection agencies, as well as this headquarters. The IAC will emphasize three types of intelligence in support of the C Detachments' mission; Combat Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Internal Intelligence.

b. On 10 July, it was determined that a need for closer coordination between elements of the Group S-2 and S-3 Sections was needed. To this end, Order of Battle Specialists from each CTZ were married up with Area Study ECO's of respective CTZ's to form Area Specialist Teams. The new system has provided for a closer integration of operations and intelligence, with an added benefit of more rapid reaction to incoming information.

## 3. Operations and Training.

a. CIDG Program: The pacification of the areas around camps Buon Ea Yang and Plei Do Lim in II Corps, and Camp An Phu in IV Corps, and Camp An Phu in IV Corps has progressed to the point that conversion is imminent.

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The scheduled date for conversion to Regional Force units is 1 August. Total CIDG troop strength at the end of this period is 33,457\*. There are 57 CIDG camps presently situated throughout the Republic of Viet Nam. Within the past three months CIDG units conducted in excess of 11,000 ambushes, including search and destroy operations and raids on fixed VC installations. Heaviest damage was inflicted on Viet Cong logistical cache locations. CIDG initiated offensive operations resulted in 620 contacts.

b. Training:

(1) During the three months reporting period 624 students graduated from courses presented at the Dong Ba Thin Training Center. 593 students are presently enrolled in either CIDG or LLDB courses.

(2) LLDB Class # 6, which started during the previous quarter, graduated 15 Officers and 89 Enlisted Men on 24 May 1966. Class # 7 began on 30 May with 25 Officers and 94 NCO's/EM. The basic course was completed on 16 July and specialized training is still in progress with the following breakdown:

(a) Officers Course	22
(b) Operations and Intell	20
(c) Weapons	18
(d) Demolitions	18
(e) Medics	21
(f) Communications	11

(3) LLDB Basic Training Class # 1 graduated 79 students on 4 June. Class # 2 commenced on 28 June with 21 students, and Class # 3 began on 25 July with 96 students.

(4) Classes # 13 and # 14 for Combat Recon Platoons graduated on 30 May (127 students), and 11 July (128 students) respectively. Class # 15 began on 19 July with 132 students.

(5) CIDG Leadership Class # 15 ended on 24 May with 120 graduates and Class # 16 Graduated 119 students on 2 July. Class # 17 began on 12 July with 137 students.

\* An increase of 70 companies is scheduled for FY 1967, bringing the total strength of CIDG companies to 260 companies, at 132 men per company.

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4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

a. During the period 1 May 1966 through 31 July 1966, the 5th Special Forces Group has placed maximum stress on long-term, continuing CA/PSYOP Programs at every level of command. Efforts have been focused on achieving program continuity by assignment of trained CA/PSYOP Officers and NCO's down through "A" Detachment level insofar as possible. In each functional area, primary emphasis is directed at self-help projects, use of locally-procured building materials wherever practicable, and development of individual initiative among the populace of operational areas.

b. Substantial progress has been realized in the development of planned CA/PSYOP Programs within each detachment tactical area of responsibility. In coordination with LLDB counterparts, VIS, USAID, JUSPAO, plus representatives from any other interested agencies, USASF CA/PSYOP personnel have conducted surveys to determine local needs. Upon completion, these surveys are invaluable for annual planning, programming and budgeting. Detachment surveys and programs are established for two successive six-month periods. They are up-dated periodically to insure that all plans and projects are maintained current.

c. During the three month reporting period ending 31 July 1966, 5,091 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local civilians and to expand GVN area of control were completed in Special Forces operational areas. Included in this figure are the construction and/or repair of: 89 schools, 54 dispensaries, 13 hospitals, 72 bridges, 51 latrines, 15 fish ponds, 107 wells, 87 dwellings, and 55 VIS information booths. Other projects included provision of 2,853,808 pounds of food for over 72,000 refugees which are located in detachment operational areas. USASF and VNSF Medics, and Special Forces trained Village Health Workers treated 364,500 patients in camp dispensaries while conducting 1,155 CA medical patrols.

d. The CIDG Motivation and Indoctrination Team under the advisorship of nine USASF advisors has been expanded from 12 cadre to 59 cadre. Organized into 12 five man units, it is now capable of training 680 men per month. During this three month reporting period, 1,088 CIDG and 216 PF soldiers received motivational training from MIP Teams.

e. In order to increase protein content of the Vietnamese daily diet, numerous long range agriculture projects have been initiated during this reporting period. They include animal husbandry, family gardens, experimental farms, and fish pond construction/stocking. In animal husbandry prime breeding cows, bulls, hogs, goats, poultry, and rabbits have been purchased and issued to various operational detachments for breeding purposes. Selected families feed and care for the female animals until the young are born and weaned. At this time the family is given several

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of the offspring and the adult female is passed on to another family. Two 850 egg incubators were also purchased. They are being used as a pilot project to determine feasibility of hatchery production at the "A" Detachment level. Thirteen "A" Detachments have constructed fish ponds which are managed by CIDG or local civilians trained at USASF/TNSF Fishery School in Nha Trang.

f. Motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG remains one of the primary tasks for all persons advising the CIDG. A new program to complement the MIP and the troop indoctrination and education program has been instituted. This program has received additional emphasis because the CIDG are the most valuable assets of the CIDG program. Overall effectiveness of camp operations and the very survival of the USASF personnel often depend on effectiveness of CIDG. Through the use of powerful public address systems and tape recorders, selected daily propaganda messages are delivered, interspersed with appropriate music appealing to emotions and attitudes of strike force members. The objective here is to develop and solidify the loyalty, dependability, and fighting spirit of these personnel. In turn, the CIDG soldier is made aware of his role in this war, the advantages of his position, GVN objectives, and VC/NVA activities.

g. S-5 at SFOB Nha Trang, has published a PSYOP Guide for operational "A" Detachments. The guide, part of a handbook covering a wide variety of subjects pertinent to operations at the "A" Detachment level provides information for immediate implementation and emphasized operational aspects of PSYOP. It is expected that the PSYOP Guide will be of great assistance to those CA/PSYOP personnel who have already had experience at the "A" Detachment level.

h. Recent reports reflect the valuable contributions being made by the PSYOP companies throughout the four Corps in their support of Special Forces Operations. The May and June CA/PSYOP Monthly Evaluation Reports stress the contributions of these companies. In the recently published CA/PSYOP Guide for Operational "A" Detachments, CA/PSYOP personnel are urged to consult these PSYOP Companies for advice and support.

i. Tape recorders and loudspeakers have been distributed to most of the "A" detachments as of this date. Recorders and loudspeakers for the remaining detachments are currently in supply channels and distribution will be completed in the next two weeks. These units will be invaluable in support of local PSYOP programs. They are lightweight, portable, and possess the capability for vehicular mount. Their many uses include: rallies, news broadcasts, propaganda speeches, indoctrination messages, and support of the CIDG Camp Commanders Information Program. Tapes of appropriate music have also been disseminated to be used in conjunction with the above operations.

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j. For the three month reporting period, statistics reveal the following: [24,851,250 leaflets disseminated, 298 PSYOP rallies conducted, 391 airborne loudspeaker missions conducted, and 682 Chieu Hoi's or returnees. Most significant is the fact that the Chieu Hoi returnees continue to increase. There can be no doubt that this program continues to be a most effective PSYOP effort within 5th SFCA.

k. Inclosures 7 and 8 provide typical examples of CA and PSYOP projects conducted during this reporting period.

### 5. Personnel Administrative Activities.

a. The only significant departure from previous personnel reports is the fact that TDY Detachments are no longer attached to the 5th SFCA for a six month period. All 5th Group personnel are PCS for the normal tour with the exception of a few engineer personnel.

b. The MTO&E submitted on 7 June 1966 is still pending final approval by DA.

### 6. Logistical Activities.

#### a. General:

(1) During the period 1 May to 31 July 1966 the Logistical Support Center of the Special Forces Operational Base in Nha Trang continued to provide overall logistical support including supply, maintenance, movements, food service and construction to the Special Forces operational detachments and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group spread throughout the length and breadth of the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Plans continued for the decentralization of the logistical system down to the C detachment level in order for the C detachment to support the Special Forces Operational detachments in each Corps area as is currently practiced in I Corps. Decentralization will result in more responsive support to the supported units due to the closer proximity of the supply source and will allow for optimum utilization of available aircraft. It will also allow for continuity of the supply flow in concert with USARV OPLAN 79-66 should enemy action result in a temporary paralysis of the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang. Detachment C-4 in Can Tho has completed a warehouse facility and is now receiving supplies for the detachments in IV CTZ. Although their logistical support will be limited in scope because of the small area in which they have to conduct their logistical operation, they will be able to begin filling requisitions on fast-moving, high-demand type items by the end of August. It is currently planned to have Detachment C-3, Bien Hoa decentralized in September and Detachment C-2, Pleiku decentralized in November.

(3) 5th Special Forces Reg 00-1, "Logistics" was updated and revised. It is consolidated and replaced all previous logistical and supply regulations and filled in many information gaps previously existing because of the lack of written guidance. In addition Reg 210-2, "Camp Construction" was updated and revised.

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(4) Conversion of three CIDG camps to Regional Force has been planned. All property on the RF TOC will be turned over to the RF. Arrangements are to be effected for reimbursement in kind of all converted items. All other property declared mission essential is being loaned to the MACV Advisory Team for a period not to exceed 90 days, after which it will be returned to the CIDG program.

b. Supply:

(1) During the reporting period new equipment was introduced into the supply system. The "Bata Boot" which was unsuitable because of poor quality was replaced by an indigenous jungle boot procured in Japan which has a longer wear than the "Bata Boot". Also a light weight, tightly woven nylon hammock and poncho were purchased for issue to the CIDG. Similar in texture and weight to a parachute canopy, easily carried on the individual soldier, and waterproof, these two items at approximately \$2.00 apiece replaced the standard US poncho which alone costs \$5.65. Starlight scopes were requested for each "A" Detachment, but except for a few provided by ACTIV, they have not as yet been received. Kerosene three burner stoves were received and issued to the field in order to supplement existing butane stoves which are intermittently out of butane gas in the field due to a bottle shortage. 10KW water cooled generators were ordered by the counterinsurgency Support Office through Air Force Channels based on recommendations from the field that the gas driven, air cooled 5 and 10KW standard Army generators were not proving satisfactory for maintenance and life. Materials handling equipment totalling \$637,000 was ordered for the decentralization program. 150 2½ ton multifueled trucks and 150 M-151 ½ ton trucks were also placed on order in addition to sufficient air items for a capability of dropping heavy loads from C-130 aircraft. 54 airboats have been ordered and are due-in during the next quarter.

(2) After analyzing the reasons behind periodic depletions of common stocked items it was determined that the Requisitioning Objective (RO) and the stock levels were too low. The Requisitioning Objective was raised to 90 days from the previous 60 days and an additional 50% of commonly stocked items was placed on request.

(3) Personnel of LSC worked during the evening hours to complete a 40 x 100 foot warehouse in order to store and maintain a reserve level of rice which is critical to the CIDG program. Periodic shortages of rice developed from transportation and procurement problems in Saigon.

(4) Maintenance:

(a) During the period 1 May to 31 July there has been a steady increase of work performed by the LSC Maintenance Facility. The work load has increased by approximately 5% over the previous period of time.

(b) A study was made to determine the necessary tools required for a B and C Detachment automotive repair facility. Requisitions for these items have been submitted. Further, one (1) shop van has been requested for this location.

(c) Construction of a new maintenance shop building with office commenced in May. Target date for completion sometime in August.

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(d) In order to assist the Detachment's PLL's (Preceded Load Lists) have been submitted to help facilitate the detachment repair parts program.

(5) Engineer Construction:

(a) During the reporting period four two story buildings within the Signal Complex were completed. The fifth building is 70% finished. A power plant building for the SFOB has been completed. The necessary equipment to provide the power has been ordered, however to date has not arrived.

(b) Six existing buildings have been enlarged. A four meter extension was added to five BOD's providing additional living space for 10 officers. The Personnel Office was enlarged by erecting a roof, pouring a floor, and constructing end walls between buildings.

(c) Construction on the Group Officer's Club commenced with scheduled completion date by 4 September.

7. Air Movement.

a. Logistical Movement of Supplies - Tons:

	<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2d Quarter</u>
Jan -	3,673	April - 4,366
Feb -	3,170	May - 5,098
Mar -	4,635	June - 4,675
	11,498 Tons	14,139 Tons

During the 2d Quarter of 1966 the Air Movement Section of LSC moved 23% more supplies, exactly 2,641 tons, than during the 1st quarter. Noteworthy was the amount of supplies moved during the month of May which totaled over 10 million pounds of all classes of supplies. This was the first time that the LSC has issued and moved over 10 million pounds of supplies in one month.

This achievement is due in part to a transportation system never before used by this group, namely Sealift. This section moved approximately 889 tons of supplies, to C-1 Da Nang and C-4 Can Tho by LST. This system proved very effective for everyone concerned for the following reasons:

(1) The LSTs were easily obtained through the Traffic Management Agency, TMA.

(2) Each LST was capable of hauling several million pounds of supplies at one time.

(3) Bulk supplies from LSC area were easily transported to the ship with a minimum of preparation, in comparison to the preparation necessary for airlift. Once the supplies arrived at the beach, the Alaskan Barge Company, took on the responsibility of loading the LST. They were capable of loading/off loading 700 tons of supplies daily.

(4) Upon arrival of the LST at Can Tho, the supplies were off-loaded by an Army Transportation Co(Stevedore) and transported by them to the C-4 location. The C-4 supply personnel had only to off-load the supplies from this company's trucks. At Da Nang, port personnel off-loaded the LST and loaded C-1's trucks. Both Sealift operations took between 4 to 5 days to complete and were accomplished in a very smooth and efficient manner by all concerned. The Sealift system is now considered an integrated part of the LSC movement plan and will be utilized whenever bulk supply requirements warrant its use.



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Annual Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28  
(R1)) for period ending 31 July 1966**b. Logistical Aircraft Support:**

(1) C-123 Aircraft - the group continued to receive a minimum of three C-123s in direct support on a daily basis during the quarter. There was an average of 3 sorties per aircraft daily, thus, the LSC could count on moving approximately 90,000 lbs of supplies per day by C-123. However, during the latter part of June an increased amount of aircraft maintenance resulted in a 20% cancellation of scheduled missions. Once a direct support aircraft goes down for maintenance, there is very little chance of a substitute being provided by the Air Force.

(2) C-130 Aircraft - as outlined in the previous quarterly report, these aircraft continue to make a tremendous difference in the logistical airlift capabilities of the LSC. During the first two quarters of 1966, these aircraft have averaged over 3 million pounds of supplies moved monthly. The C-130s have been used predominantly to move supplies in bulk to Detachments C-1 and C-4. At these locations the bulk supplies are broken down and moved by smaller aircraft, i.e. C-123 and CV2B, to the "A" Campsites.

(3) CV2B Aircraft - each of the "C" Detachments continues to receive at least one CV2B Caribou in direct support on a daily basis. These aircraft provide the necessary airlift support to camps with short, unimproved airstrips. Here at the LSC, four CV2Bs continue to provide daily support to "A" Camps within II and III Corps. These 4 direct support aircraft averaged over 1½ million pounds per month during the quarter. These aircraft provide the group commander and the LSC with a flexible airlift capability, ready to react to rapidly changing needs.

(4) Lessons Learned - Utilization of Logistical Aircraft - the increased logistical support of the group country-wide, has dictated to a greater need of C-130 support. This increase, 45% more supplies airlifted to our detachments during the 2d half of FY 66, has verified the requirement for decentralization at the "C" Detachment level. There, the supplies are broken down for issue to the "A" and "B" detachments and airlifted by C-123s and CV2Bs. In essence, this system typifies the forward supply point concept normally utilized within a field army area by the Army Division located there. During the last two quarters of FY 66, the utilization of C-130 aircraft in support of the Special Forces logistical program, and in particular the decentralization program, has proved to be rapid, continuous and a very efficient method of getting all classes of supplies to the lowest echelon of command within the 5th SFGA.

**c. Airdrop capabilities:**

The airdrop method of resupply under normal operating conditions amounted to approximately 7.1% of all deliveries made to the group's "A" camps country-wide during the 2d half of FY 66. This figure clearly indicates that the group's airdrop capability can still be considered a normal means of resupplying our camps. Presently, no "standard" army airdrop method is employed by the group because the majority of airdrops are made from the tailgate of the C-123 aircraft. The airdrop method employed by the group is a tactical method developed in Vietnam for use with the C-123 aircraft. Under this method clustered G-13 parachutes were used on loads weighing up to 1500 pounds. The number of parachutes used on each load was based on the 500 lbs cargo carrying capability of the G-13 (1500 lbs load required 3 G-13 parachute clustered). This method has proved to be effective and economical as well as very accurate with a low malfunction rate.

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In April the rigger platoon began using the T-7A Cargo parachute which was issued to the group in lieu of the G-13. At the outset several discrepancies arose while airdropping loads that had T-7A parachutes clustered on them. The principal discrepancy was the fact that many of the T-7A canopies were damaged during the opening shock, and approximately 5% of all parachutes malfunctioned, i.e. Mac West or Streamers during these airdrops. In order to maintain our airdrop capability using T-7A cargo parachutes, which have the same rated capacity as the G-13, several test airdrops were performed after several adjustments were made to the parachute and load. The test drops proved concretely that the T-7A parachute could be used with this tactical airdrop method, if the following adjustments or modifications were made.

(1) Use a skirt hesitator on the canopy of all T-7A cargo chutes. This hesitator is nothing more than a tie made around the lower skirt of the canopy using 80 lbs cotton tape. This tie prevents the canopy from opening while it is still in the prop blast of the aircraft. (It delays opening approximately 1 second). It also enables all parachutes that are clustered to open simultaneously, thus reducing the canopy damage caused by one chute opening sooner than the others, which results in a total load opening shock on the one canopy.

(2) The cargo carrying capacity of the T-7A parachute was reduced from 500 lbs to 400 lbs per chute for use within the group. Any load weighing over an increment of 400 lbs requires an additional T-7A, thus, a 1000 lbs load now requires 3 T-7As clustered.

(3) In clustering T-7A cargo chutes, their attachment to the load must be as close together as possible. This adjustment reduces the possibility of one chute opening sooner than the others.

(4) All airdrop loads consisting of fragile items or easily broken containers, i.e. rice bags, cement bags or bottles, were rigged with a minimum of one layer of honeycomb. This honeycomb, and dissipator, absorbs up to 75% of the ground impact shock felt by the load. It is estimated that 25% of normal breakage caused by ground impact is reduced by the use of the honeycomb material.

(5) Lessons learned in Airdrop:

The tactical airdrop method from the C-123 and CV2B aircraft continues to be normal means of resupplying the SF camps countrywide. Airdrop is required where no airstrip exist or where an airstrip has become unsafe for landing due to weather or enemy action. It is also the normal or planned method of resupplying any Special Forces Camp under enemy attack, therefore its operational use must be guaranteed at all times. During the past quarter a change in cargo parachutes available to the group (T-7A for G13) temporarily reduced the operational capability of the airdrop method of resupply. However, by making several adjustments (outlined above) in the packing of the T-7A cargo parachute and the rigging of the airdrop loads within the group, which were tested on actual airdrop missions, the airdrop capability of the group is again fully operational. The airdrop method employed by the group continues to allow airdropping of loads from a minimum altitude of 350 feet, at an airspeed of 130 knots. This method provides for impact accuracy which far exceeds the normal low velocity method of airdrop; a criteria that must be guaranteed when resupplying SF Camps that are under enemy attack.

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8. Medical.

a. CIDG - Dependent dispensary and maternity ward: In June 1966 the LLDB and 5th SFGA Surgeon's Section opened and presently are jointly staffing this 20 bed facility in the Nha Trang LLDB medical compound.

b. CIDG Troop Dispensary: Plans have been finalized for this facility of 30 beds to be staffed jointly by the LLDB and the 5th SFGA Surgeon's Section. Construction is programmed for August 1966. This facility will also be used as a training center for the LLDB and CIDG medics.

c. Vietnamese phrase book for sick call: This booklet prepared by the 5th SFGA Surgeon and published by USAID and JUSPAO is being distributed to all medical personnel in their organization. A second printing has been made to fill requests from other US medical personnel.

d. Medical Civic Action: A new monthly high for outpatient treatment of indigenous personnel was reached in July 1966 with a total of 122,000 treatments. This represents 40% of the entire USARV treatment figure for the month.

e. Special Forces Hamlet Health Worker Training Course: The first cycle of this course has been successfully given to 11 students at Detachment C-1. A second course for 13 students will begin on 1 August at Detachment C-1. USAID has proposed to the GVN Ministry of Health that the Special Forces Hamlet Health training program be used as a basis for a national Hamlet Health Worker school with a training center at each C Detachment. USAID, MILPHAP, LLDB Province Medical Chiefs and other civilian and military personnel would participate in the instruction.

f. ADY Medical Training Team: The first four training teams have completed their tour and returned to 1st SFGA and 156th Medical Detachment, Okinawa. Personnel trained included 168 USMC medics, 193 CIDG medics and 11 Hamlet Health Workers. Four 2 man training teams have been requested from 1st SFGA, Okinawa and will enter RVN on or about 1 September 1966 to continue this program.

g. Laboratory Support: The Army Medical Research Team - Vietnam (AMRT) has provided media to 5th SFGA for the collection of bacteriological specimens and will perform studies on material submitted to assist in the diagnosis of disease. This media and instructions for its use have been issued to all detachments.

h. Dapson (DDS) Malaria Prophylaxis: 5th SFGA personnel from Project Delta were part of a study group using this drug. During the study Project Delta operated in an area of high malaria endemicity and sustained no malaria casualties. During operations in the same area November 1965, 15 of 23 Delta Project personnel developed malaria.

9. Signal.

a. Total traffic count again continued to increase during the reporting period with a gradual rise for an average total of 6,255 messages handled by the SFOB comm/center whereas the comm/centers at subordinate headquarters handled an average total of 3,315 messages. The total traffic count is again expected to increase as more intelligence information is transmitted between Hqs and laterally between SFOB, C and B detachments due to the proposed establishment of an intelligence analysis center at "C" detachment level.

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(41) for period ending 31 July 1966

b. b. Co E, (Signal) after conducting lengthy operations and tests concluded that the combined comm/center transmitter and receiver antenna field did not provide satisfactory, interference-free communications to subordinate stations. This was due primarily to the close proximity of transmit and receive antennas and the operation of several different modes, i.e. Radio teletype, single/side band voice and All voice nets through the same antenna fields. A survey of possible antenna field sites was conducted by the Group Signal Officer and the decision was made to acquire a piece of real estate located at Trung Dung in the Dien Khanh District of Khanh Hoa Province. The property consisting of a 500 foot by 500 foot soccer field was formally acquired through the province chief on or about 15 July 1966. Current plans are to construct a transmitter building, power building and nine (9) 50 f antenna towers on this property. The signal complex receiver site will remain in its present location.

c. Long lines circuit requirement for this unit have been submitted to USARV, MACV. Mqs 5th SFGA is requesting point to point teletype and voice circuits from Co E, comm/center, Nha Trang to each "C" Detachment and B-55 Saigon. these wire circuits would provide 24 hour a day full duplex teletype service and voice communications with an immediate restoration priority in the event of circuit outage. The group radio-teletype net and the group single/side band net would then become the backup communications system. It is anticipated that upon completion of the wire system the message handling capacity of SFOB and "C" detachments will be materially increased.

d. The requirement for radio frequencies in the high frequency band (2 to 12 MCS) continues to increase as the group expands. Liaison visits by the Group Signal Officer to USARV Signal Section and MACV J-6 during Jul 1966 disclosed the fact that additional sole user radio frequencies in the 2 to 12 MCS range are just not available, due to congestion in these bands. The 2 to 12 MCS bands are the most widely used frequencies at intermediate distance in Vietnam. The radio frequency Officer at MACV J-6 stated that if 5th SFGA could utilize high frequencies in the 12 to 20 MCS range, authorization would not be a problem as sufficient frequencies are available for issue in this band. Experimentation is under way to determine if this frequency range can be utilized on short distance, All, high frequency radio nets.

e. CIDG RF/PF Conversion: The camp conversion program of converting CIDG companies to RF/PF companies is currently underway in II CTZ as certain camps attain the requirements for change over. Some problems have arisen as to what type and how much signal equipment would be retained by the camps and how much would be removed. A permanent transfer loan program was initiated in II CTZ and the following arrangements were made:

Plei Do Lim:Permanent Transfer

TA-312/PT	20 ea
SB-993/GT	1 ea
RC-292	3 ea
AN/GRC-87	1 ea

Boun Ea Yang:

TA-312/PT	20 ea
RC-202	1 ea
AN/PRC-10	3 ea
AN/GRC-87	1 ea

Temporary Loan

TR-20	3 ea
HT-1	24 ea
AN/PRC-25	3 ea

TR-20	3 ea
HT-1	40 ea
SB-22/PT	1 ea
AN/PRC-25	1 ea

SECRET

SVSP-C

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Items permanently transferred because they are on RF/PF TOE. Items on loan will not impair installation of Ban Don and other camps as they will be returned prior to actual need at the new camps.

f. HL-6/TSEC Cryptographic: A study of present traffic volume of one time pad encrypted messages shows sufficient similarity in work load between B Detachments to justify allocation of the HL-6/TSEC (Mechanical One Time Pad Encipher/Decipher Device) to all B Detachments. If the HL-6/TSEC is to be utilized, allocation should be one per B Detachment.

(1) Introduction of the HL-6/TSEC will probably increase the amount of encrypted messages transmitted from B to A detachments since many messages now sent in the clear will be encrypted due to faster method of operation of the HL-6/TSEC.

(2) The more stringent physical security requirements of the HL-6/TSEC should not be disadvantageous since improvements in many "B" Detachments cryptographic facilities are planned and in some cases underway.

(3) The recommended operational requirement will be for 20 each HL-6/TSEC for delivery in FY 68-69. Allocations to be as follows:

I CTZ	2
II CTZ	5
III CTZ	6
IV CTZ	3
B-52	1
C-5	1
SFOB Float	1
Total	20

10. (S) CIDG Finance:

a. CIDG Finance prepared and submitted the Fiscal Year 1967 Command Operating budget thru MACV to USARPAC on 3 May 66. FY 67 requirements were submitted as follows:

In-Country	\$44.7 million
Out-of-Country	
O&MA	16.8
PEMA	32.7
Total	\$94.2 million

b. Fiscal Year 1968 Command Budget Estimate was prepared and submitted thru MACV to USARPAC on 5 Jul 66. On 2 June 66, CIDG Finance Officer and Group S-4 representative made a 10 day liaison trip to CISO in Okinawa for the purpose of preparing the out-of-country portion of the budget estimate. As a result of this trip FY 67 requirements as submitted in the FY 67 Budget request were updated and included in the FY 68 budget estimate. FY 67 and 68 requirements were submitted as follows:

	FY 67	FY 68
In-Country O&MA	\$41.9 million	\$48.2 million
Out-of-Country		
O&MA	19.7	21.3
PEMA	30.7	29.7
Total	\$92.3 million	\$99.3 million

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SECRET

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SECRET

c. In June, Premier Ky announced a 30% pay increase for all RVNAR personnel retroactive to 1 June 1966. Therefore it became necessary to raise pay and allowances for all CIDG paramilitary forces in a like amount. This raise resulted in a 5 million dollar increase to FY 67 requirements for pay and allowances.

d. On 23 June, CIDG Finance Officer was informed that the rate for piastre conversion at the official rate had been changed from 72.77 VND to 71.00 US, to a new rate of 79.20 VND to 71.00 US. This change resulted in a paper loss of \$150,362 on the CIDG Finance records as of 1 July 1966.

e. 5th SFCA Reg 37-1 was revised effective 1 July 66. Included in the revised regulation are a new pay scale for MIKE Force and Strike Force Personnel, the new subsistence rates for the Corps areas, and the expenditure limitations for supplies and equipment, camp construction, Civil Affairs/Psy Ops, repair and maintenance, and intelligence.

f. CIDG Finance Officer established a new cost code structure which will reflect more accurate data by type of expenditure. Basically the 37 cost codes previously used were consolidated into 20 cost codes, thereby significantly reducing the unnecessary recording of cost data and report preparation.

g. DA Message 773658, dated 14 July 1966, established the FY 67 Switchback Annual Funding Program as follows:

In-Country O&M	\$34.4 million
Out-of-Country	
CIA	18.6
P&MA	29.4
Total	\$82.4 million

In country fund allocation for the 1st quarter FY67 was 8.6 million dollars. This level of funding was not considered sufficient to cover the projected level of expenditures during the first quarter, primarily due to the recent pay increase in subsistence. Accordingly a request was submitted requesting an additional \$2 million allocation. DA Message 775985, dated 29 Jul 1966, increased the 1st quarter allocation by \$2 million to a new total of 10.6 million dollars.

#### 11. Future Plans:

a. A contingency assessment of all CIDG camps for possible conversion to RF is in progress. Detachment A-426 at Tri Ton is scheduled to be replaced by a MACV Advisory team on 15 September.

A staff study is in progress to consider moving the 1st Detachment now located at Chan Doc, IV Corps, to the Ca Mau peninsula, with an undetermined number of subordinate "B" Detachments.

b. Two new camps are planned at Ban Don and Duc Lap in western II Corps. A C-130 airfield will be constructed at one of these camps to assist conventional units in establishing a staging area for large scale B-57 operations. The detachments for these camps will be assigned from Plei Do Lin and Buon Ma Yang which were converted on 1 August.

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c. An expansion of the Project Delta capability is being studied to enable FMAF units in II and III Corps to have permanent Delta-type unit available for their use. Anticipated date for operational readiness of the expanded concept is NLT 30 August 1966.

14 Incl  
as

*Harry C. Fisher*  
HARRY C. FISHER JR  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

US CASUALTY CHART - 2D QUARTER VS 1ST QUARTER 66

	<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2d Quarter</u>
KIA	16	17
MIA	65	70
DLA	0	4

INCLOSURE 1 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
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# COMPARATIVE CIDG/VC CASUALTY FIGURES

AIA:	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ		IV CTZ	
	VC	CIDG	VC	CIDG	VC	CIDG	VC	CIDG
1st Quarter	75	68	619	111	183	78	493	83
2nd Quarter	95	22	457	100	191	44	121	59

## KIA RATION:

1st Quarter	1.2:1	5.6:1	2.3:1	5.9:1
2nd Quarter	4.3:1	4.5:1	4.3:1	2.0:1

ENCLOSURE 2 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned(RCS  
CSGPC-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

1. GENERAL - I CTZ

DET	LOC	COORD	DATE STARTED	VNCF CO	VNCF	NO.	USAF CO	USAF	CIDG	PF	PF	WPI'S	CCTP	WPI'S	MISSILE
												IS.	TNG	IS.	
C-1	DA NANG	BT075724	SEP 62	MAJ KHOAI	12/42	16/49	LTCOL FACEY	74							CONTROL
B-11	QUANG NGAI	BS640730	MAR 66	CPT THUAN	4/13	7/19	MAJ TRUESDALE								CONTROL
A-101	KHE SANH	XD849419	SEP 62	LT LINH	3/13	3/10	CPT HUTTON	3/335	579	5				12	CIDG/BS/SS
A-102	TIEN PHUOC	BT107142	NOV 65	LT VAN MAU	3/9	2/11	CPT HARI	4/571	135	576					CIDG/SS
A-103	GIA VUC	BS378270	FEB 63	LT VAN TAI	3/12	2/41	CPT PERRY	3/410		12	6				CIDG
A-104	HA THANH	BS390701	APR 65	LT DAI	3/12	2/9	CPT CAMPION	3/280	106	463					CIDG/SS
A-105	KHAM DUC	ZC008081	SEP 63	CPT KY	4/13	2/9	CPT KERNITZ	3/315		122	134				CIDG/SS
A-106	BA TO	BS567323	MAR 65	LT THANH	3/9	2/10	CPT GAFFNEY	3/373	98	288					CIDG/SS
A-107	TRA BONG	BS344884	MAR 65	LT DIEP	2/10	2/9	CPT HORAN (AATTV)	3/387	85	478	34				CIDG/SS
A-108	MINH LONG	BS335513	MAY 66	CPT KHANH	2/5	2/9	CPT AMICK	1/147	143	75					CIDG/SS
A-109	TUONG DUC	ZC153542	APR 66	CPT GLAN	1/6	3/10	CPT STUIGA	3/315	137	274			25		CIDG/SS
A-113	DA NANG EAST	BT073721	AUG 62	N/A		1/8	CPT MURPHY (AATTV)			120	216		394		MIKE FORCE
TOTALS:				40/144		44/164	26/3207	2733	704	390	259		431		

REF	LOC	COORD	DATE	NO.	USAF	USAF CO	USAF	CIDG	REF	PF	WPNS	COMP	MITE	MISSION
											ISS	TNG	FORCE	
A-219	PLEIKU	AR765502	OCT 62	17/48	17/55	LTCOL PHUNG	17/55				140			CONTROL
B-22	QUI NHON	AR765475	JUL 66	1/1	3/17	CPT HOLLAND	3/17					202	3/607	MITE
A-221	CUNG SON	CR088236	JUL 66	5/12	10/21	LTC HASSINGER	10/21							CONTROL
A-222	DONG TRE	BQ801434	JAN 66	2/9	2/9	CPT COURRY	2/9	4/507	1/107	9/308		295		CIDG/SS
A-223	VAN CANH	BQ987706	JUN 63	2/9	3/15	CPT HOLMES	3/15	5/643	4/306	12/331				CIDG/SS
A-224	PHU TUC	BR830060	AUG 65	1/7	2/11	CPT BART	2/11	5/490						CIDG
A-226	MAI LINH	BQ504598	MAY 65	2/6	3/9	CPT RUSSELL	3/9	5/959	2/172	9/225				CIDG/SS
A-227	BONG SON	BQ245922	SEP 65	1/12	3/16	CPT NIEL JAS	3/16	5/664	2/185	15/711				CIDG/SS
A-228	VINH THANH	BR848947	MAY 65	2/8	2/11	CPT LE BEAU	2/11	3/482			62	117		CIDG
B-23	BAN ME THUOT	BR615605	OCT 65	2/8	2/10	CPT TINSETH	2/10	5/542		/108		57		CIDG
A-232	TAN RAI	AQ780040	NOV 64	4/14	8/18	MAJ GILLETTE	8/18							CONTROL
A-233	BUN EA YANG	ZFO98875	JAN 66	2/11	2/9	CPT CARR	2/9	4/512			22	354		CIDG
A-234	AN LAC	BQ092034	APR 65	2/12	2/11	CPT DANIEL	2/11	5/599	2/691					CIDG/SS
A-235	NHON CO	AP865483	MAY 65	2/10	2/11	CPT SINCERE	2/11	6/570			65	65		CIDG
A-236	LAC THIEN	YU804250	MAR 66	2/8	2/10	CPT RICHIE	2/10	4/450			26			CIDG
		AP971756	MAY 65	2/6	2/8	CPT JACKSON	2/8	3/535	2/820		135			CIDG/SS

## 1 GENERAL - II CTZ

D.A.	LOC	COORD	DATE STARTED	VLSF CO	VLSF	DEASF CO	USASF	CIDG	PF	WPNS ISS	CCP TIM	NITE FORCE
A-237	LUCNG SON	EN124384	JAN 66	CPT QUE	2/12	CPT SUEIGART	2/9	4/418			80	CIDG
A-238	BUNN BLECH	BQ008594	JUL 66			CPT FOESIE	2/6	2/483				CIDG
B-24	KONTUM	AR773889	JAN 66	CPT TUU	4/17	LTCOL ROSSI	7/17					CONTROL
A-241	POLEI KIENG	ZAO31932	MAR 66	LT TRIEU	1/11	CPT MONROE	2/9	4/557		589		CIDG
A-242	DAK PEK	YB947684	NOV 62	CPT PHUONG	2/12	CPT SAUFORD	2/9	5/751		2		CIDG
A-243	PLATTAU GI	BSO84155	JAN 65	CPT SUNG	1/9	CPT HALL	3/15	6/779	8/233	15		CIDG
A-244	DAK TO	ZBO13212	AUG 65	LT NGHIA	2/4	CPT WEINFURTER	2/9	4/536				CIDG
A-245	DAK SEANG	YB903412	(STAGING AT DAK TO)	1/5	CPT CHANDLER	2/10	2/10	4/500		411	298	STAGING/CIDG
B-25	PLEIKU	AR765475	MAR 66	LT KY	1/7	LTCOL RABALAUGH	7/17					CONTROL
A-251	PLEI DJERENG	YA857531	JUN 64	MAJ HINI	3/8	CPT MOORE	2/10	4/557				CIDG/BS
A-252	PLEI MROAG	ZA113675	NOV 62	CPT BAD	2/9	CPT BUTTERMORE	2/11	4/702				CIDG/BS
A-253	DUC CO	YA841248	JUN 62	LT LAP	2/7	CPT CUNNINGHAM	3/12	4/810		55	65	CIDG/BS
A-254	PLEI DO LIM	AR886282	APR 62	CPT LINH	1/11	CPT WORD	2/8	4/518		30	30	CIDG
A-255	Plei Me	ZA162059	OCT 63	LT HUYNH	2/8	CPT WARRENBURG	2/10	4/551		86	86	CIDG
B-50	NHA TRANG	CP031518	JUL 66			MAJ CEARY	5/5			12		CIDG CONTROL
B-51	DONG BA THIN	CP040290	APR 64	CPT TAG	4/9/182	MAJ GRUENE	5/18	3/405		2		CIDG/TRIM
B-52	NHA TRANG	CP031518		MAJ TAT	28/109	MAJ LUTHELL	14/84					PROJ VELL
A-501	NGUYEN VAN TAN	CP031518	SEP 63	CPT LUU	4/10	CPT EARLYLINE	2/8	3/430			68	CIDG
A-502	TRUNG LUNG	BP937557	MAR 64	CPT HANH	3/8	CPT JOHNSON	4/11	4/551	1/132			CIDG/SS
A-503	NHA TRANG	CP031518	JUN 64			CPT CARTER	2/16					NIKE
TOTALS:					158/610		137/535	133/15501	53/1916	1662	1717	3/402 6/1009

GENERAL - III CTZ

LT	LOC	COORD	DATE STARTED	VNSF CO	NO. VNSF	US/SP CO	NO. USASF	CIDG	RF	PF	WPMS ISS	COMP TNG	MISSION
C-3	BIEN HOA	YT007123	NOV 64	MAJ CAN	20/69	LTCOL HIDDLESTON	20/60	38					CONTROL
A-301	TRANG SUP	XT166555	FEB 63	LT LAN	2/13	CPT WELKER	2/9	4/739			77		CIDG
A-302	BIEN HOA	YT007124	NOV 64			CPT MTERCHIN	2/12					572	CIDG
B-31	XUAN LOC	YT461085	DEC 65	CPT HAI	3/12	LTCOL DAVID	7/18	1/184	17/2322	1755			CONTROL/S/SS
A-311	TANH LINH	YT929262	APR 65	CPT THOI	3/10	CPT GILBERT	2/9	4/594					CIDG
A-312	XOM CAT	YT154285	FEB 66	LT QUAN	3/7	CPT ELLIOTT	2/9	4/521				4	CIDG
B-32	TAY NINH	XT205508	DEC 64	CPT HUAN	4/12	LTCOL OCHS	9/16	1/142	20/2673				CONTROL/S/SS
A-321	BEN SOI	XT093475	MAR 65	CPT AN	3/9	CPT POTTER	2/11	5/774	5/616	485			CIDG/SS
A-322	SUOI OA	XT339577	JUN 64	CPT TIEN	1/12	CPT MADDOX	2/7	6/823					CIDG
A-323	TRAI BI	XT112702	JUN 66	LT GIOANG	2/7	CPT BURROUGHS	2/8	6/528			8		CIDG
A-324B	NUI BA DEN	XT281581	AUG 64	SGM LEN	1	LT CHILTON	1/5	1/33					RAD RELAY
A-325	BAO DOI	XT438353	APR 66			CPT DARGLE	2/9		4/471	364			SS
A-326	GO DAU HA	XT387252	APR 66	WC DUONG	1/4	CPT ZAREMBA	2/10	1/33	4/1089		133		CIDG/SS
B-33	HON QUAN	XT758878	MAY 65	CPT BAU	5/17	MAJ BARRON	8/20	78	7/795	419			CONTROL/S
A-331	LOC NINH	XU725074	MAR 63	LT DOI	2/12	LT ATANASOFF	2/13	5/656	2/231	135	35	109	CIDG/SS
A-332	MINH THANH	XT645670	DEC 63	LT LONG	2/10	CPT DIKES	2/9	4/499				34	CIDG
A-333A	CHON THANH	XT767614	MAY 65	LT NGOC	1/2	CPT SMITH	2/6	1/189	1/111	34			SS
B-34	SONG EE	YU153081	MAY 65	CPT BIEN	4/17	MAJ HARRIBEY	8/18	95	4/696	870			CONTROL/S/SS
A-341	BU DOP	XU976291	NOV 63	LT HAU	2/9	CPT COY	2/10	4/523	1/96	323			CIDG/SS
A-342	DONG XOAI	YT079762	MAY 65	CPT CHU	2/9	CPT STIEN NETZ	3/9	5/634	1/115	200			CIDG/SS

LOC	COORD	DATE SEARCHED	NO. VASF	USASF CO	NO. USASF	CIDC	RF	PF	ISS	COLF MINE	WTG	FORCE	MICRO	CIDG	CONTROL/S
A-343 DUC PFONG	YU436043	APR 66	2/8	CPT ADRIAN	2/8	4/553	1/152	182							
B-35 HIEP HOA	YT430072	APR 66	2/6	MAJ HEMERLE	11/36	2/205	1/62	298							
A-351 HIEP HOA	XT430072	APR 66		CPT EILAND	2/9	TO BE DEPLOYED	15 SEP 66								
A-352 HIEP HOA	XT430072	APR 66		CPT PHILLIPS	2/10	TO BE DEPLOYED	IN FUTURE								
A-353 XUAN LOC	YT461085	DEC 65		CPT REEVES	2/8	TO BE DEPLOYED	IN FUTURE								
A-354 HIEP HOA	XT430072	APR 66		LT MCKINNON	1/4	TO BE DEPLOYED	IN FUTURE								
						102/343	58/804.1	68/9429	5065	253	147	572			

64/246

# 1. GENERAL - IV CPZ

DET	LOC	COORD	DATE STARTED	VMSF CO	NO. VMSF	USAF CO	NO. USAF	CIDG	RF	FF	WPNS ISS	COMP TNG	MIKE FORCE	MISJICA
C-4	CAN THO	WS843116	JAN 63	MAJ CHUAN	17/43	LTCOL DALLAS	14/44	1/166						CC
B-41	MOC HOA	XS030909	FEB 65	CPT HUAN		MAJ CONN	9/15							CC/S
A-411	BINH HUNG	VQ848818	JUN 65			CPT HARRINGTON	2/10	2/149	7/820	2/140		113		CIDG/BS
A-412	CAI CAI	WT562076	APR 65	LT NGHI	3/10	CPT HECKMAN	2/117	5/721			75			CIDG/BS
A-413	BINH THANH THON	WT868032	NOV 64	CPT TAN	3/7	CPT O'CONNELL	2/10	4/465	1/110	9/342				CIDG/BS/SS
A-414	MOC HOA	XS028899	JAN 64	CPT HUAN	5/13	CPT BRIDGEMAN	2/10	5/541	2/264	10/420				CIDG/BS/SS
A-415	TUYEN NHON	XS273773	APR 65	LT AN	3/11	CPT VAY	3/11	4/367	1/87	4/163	151			CIDG/BS/SS
A-416	KINH QUAN II	WS974757	OCT 65	LT GIANG	3/13	CPT HARECEK	3/11	4/456	3/326	9/171	29			CIDG/BS
B-42	CHAU DOC	WT131842	APR 65	MAJ KIEM	4/13	LTCOL BREWER	8/14	46	9/1637	68/1616				C/S/SS
A-421	HA TIEN	VSA37447	APR 65	CPT MOI	3/8	CPT HUDSON	2/7	3/526	1/138	3/122	11			CIDG/BS/SS
A-422	VINH GIA	VS762612	AUG 64	CPT NAM	4/11	CPT SMITH	2/9	4/533			36			CIDG/BS
A-423	TINH BINH	VS953712	APR 64	CPT SON	3/10	CPT GORRELL	2/7	4/563	3/371	16/543	99	128		CIDG/BS/SS
A-424	AN PHU	WS105945	APR 64	MAJ PHOI	10/10	CPT MARVIN	2/2	6/766	3/336	17/525				CIDG/BS/SS
A-425	THUONG THOI	WS313955	MAY 66	MAJ DANH	3/9	CPT MC COY	4/12	4/526	4/436	23/834				CIDG/BS/SS
A-426	TRI TON	WS005518	MAY 65			CPT THACKER	1/8		5/593	20/584				SS
A-427	PHU QUOC	US867295	FEB 65	MAJ KIEU	3/9	CPT SLUKA	2/11	4/507	5/526	3/82				CIDG/SS
A-428	TAN CHAU	WS271936	MAY 65	CPT KICH	2/5	CPT MILES	3/10	1/231		24/901				CIDG/SS
A-429	BA XOAI	YS956628	JAN 66	CPT BAUL	3/16	CPT KAPP	3/11	5/735						CIDG
A-430	DCN PHUC	WT524004	JAN 66			CPT TOPP	3/12				18	102		MF
TOTALS:					69/188		69/225	56/7298	44/5644	208/6443	419	343	409	

# THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FIRST MILITARY ZONE

A-101 KHE SANH

PROVINCE	PROVINCE POPULATION ●
Quang Nam	629,000
Quang Ngai	701,000
Quang Tin	353,000
Quang Tri	292,000
Thua Thien	483,000

CHIEF TOWN	CHIEF TOWN POPULATION ●●
Hai An	19,000
Quang Ngai	10,000
Tam Ky	11,000
Quang Tri	12,000
Hue	113,000
Da Nang	162,000

● ESTIMATED AS OF JANUARY 1968

●● PROJECTED TO JULY 1968

## LEGEND

- ◆—◆— NATIONAL BOUNDARY
- ===== REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

- ⊙ AUTONOMOUS CITY
- PROVINCIAL CAPITAL  
OR CHIEF TOWN
- OTHER IMPORTANT  
COMMUNITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION  
AS OF AUGUST 1965  
USOM / PUB. ADMIN. DIVISION  
(UNOFFICIAL)

A-105 KHAM DUC

A-104 HA THAN

A-106 BA TO

A-103 GIA VUC

A-107 TRA BONG


A-108 MINH LONG

A-102 TIEN PHUOC

A-109 THUONG DUC  
Hoi An

A-113


C-1






# THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

## SECOND MILITARY ZONE



# THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

## THIRD MILITARY ZONE



### LEGEND

- NATIONAL BOUNDARY
- REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
- NATIONAL CAPITAL & AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE
- AUTONOMOUS CITY
- PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OR CHIEF TOWN
- OTHER IMPORTANT COMMUNITIES


- ESTIMATED AS OF JANUARY 1965
- PROJECTED TO JULY 1965
- \*\*\* ADMINISTRATIVE DELEGATION AS OF APRIL 21, 1965 AND INCLUDED IN CAPITAL MILITARY ZONE

PROVINCE	PROVINCE POPULATION*	CHIEF TOWN	CHIEF TOWN POPULATION**
Bien Hoa	345,000	Bien Hoa	43,000
Binh Duong	272,000	Phu Cuong	31,000
Binh Long	85,000	An Loc	14,000
Binh Tuy	62,000	Ham Tan	11,000
Hau Nghia	246,000	Khiem Cuong	2,000
Long An	407,000	Tan An	23,000
Long Khanh	135,000	Xuan Loc	17,000
Phuoc Long	67,000	Phuoc Binh	2
Phuoc Tuy	103,000	Phuoc Le	10,000
Tay Ninh	242,000	Tay Ninh	20,000
Vung Tau		Vung Tau	42,000

PROVINCE	POPULATION*	CAPITAL CITY	POPULATION**
Gia Dinh	807,000	Gia Dinh	78,000
Saigon	1,641,000	Saigon	1,662,000
Con Son***	2,000	Con Son***	2,000

# THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

## FOURTH MILITARY ZONE



### LEGEND

- NATIONAL BOUNDARY
- REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

- PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OR CHIEF TOWN
- OTHER IMPORTANT COMMUNITIES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION  
AS OF AUGUST 1965

UJOM / PU9 ADMIN DIVISION  
(UNOFFICIAL)

PROVINCE	PROVINCE POPULATION*	CHIEF TOWN	CHIEF TOWN POPULATION**
An Giang	467,000	Long Xuyen	27,000
An Xuyen	226,000	Quan Long	35,000
Ba Xuyen	402,000	Khanh Hung	45,000
Bac Lieu	314,000	Vinh Loi	20,000
Chau Doc	474,000	Chau Phu	11,000
Chuong Thien	273,000	Vi Thanh	3,000
Can Son***	2,000	Can Son***	2,000
Dinh Tuong	571,000	My Tho	67,000
Go Cong	183,000	Go Cong	10,000
Kien Giang	403,000	Rech Gia	48,000
Kien Hoa	618,000	Truc Giang	18,000
Kien Phong	296,000	Cao Lanh	5,000
Kien Tuong	64,000	Moc Hoa	7,000
Phong Dinh	416,000	Can Tho	77,000
Vinh Binh	568,000	Phu Vinh	20,000
Vinh Long	594,000	Vinh Long	33,000

\* ESTIMATED AS OF JANUARY 1965

\*\* PROJECTED TO JULY 1965

\*\*\* ADMINISTRATIVE DELEGATION AS OF APRIL 21, 1965  
AND INCLUDED IN CAPITAL MILITARY ZONE

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

SUBJECT: Summary of Engineer Advisory Team Activities for Second Quarter 66

1. In the previous operational report on lessons learned covering the period 30 April 1966 the employment concept of the Engineer Advisory Teams from the 539th Engineer Detachment, 1st Special Forces Group was established. Team organization was also given as well as initial starting locations. The original construction schedule for the teams consisted of fifteen different locations requiring engineer assistance in some form. This original schedule is indicated below by camp with the ones receiving some engineer help so indicated:

CORPS AREA	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	ENGR ASSIST
I	Ha Thanh	Airfield rehab	Yes
I	Thuong Duc	New camp const	
I	Minh Long	New camp const	
II	Cung Son	Rehab road & airfield	Yes
II	Luong Son	New camp const	Yes
II	Polei Kleng	New camp const	Yes
II	Duc Seang	New camp assessments	Yes
II	Ha Tay	New camp const	
III	Xom Cat	Camp drainage	Yes
III	Duc Phuong	New camp const	Yes
III	Duc Hue	New camp assessments	Yes
IV	Ba Xoi	New camp const	Yes
IV	Vinh Quan II	New camp const	Yes
IV	Don Phuc	Reopen old camp	
IV	Tan Chau	New camp const	

2. In addition to the locations designed on the initial construction program several other locations received direct engineer assistance and numerous sites were visited and received technical assistance or advice in various forms. The assistance offered to and received by the camps was quite varied and is an excellent example of the versatility of the Special Action Forces Engineer Advisory Teams capabilities in a counterinsurgency atmosphere. A list of some of the projects and a description of the work performed is given below:

CORPS AREA	LOCATION	JOB DESCRIPTION
II	Tan Rai	Airfield const
II	Dong Ba Thin	Water assessment

ENCLOSURE 5 TO SECTION II to Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSOPG-20 (R1)) 31 July 1966.

<u>CORPS AREA</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>JOB DESCRIPTION</u>
II	Pleiku	Generator survey
II	Kontum	Sand filter design
II	Polci W'rong	Ferry const
SFOB	Nha Trang	Bunker design
SFOB	Nha Trang	Hqs bldg expansion
SFOB	Nha Trang	Standards camp const
SFOB	Camp Delta	Repelling tower
III	Trai Bi	New camp const
IV	Cai Cai	Earthmoving
IV	Binh Thong	Hydro jet well
III	Bien Hoa	New camp const
III	Bien Hoa	Singapore prefab bldg
I	Da Nang	Demol rig A Shau
I	Khe Sanh	Dozer recovery

3. From February to August the Engineer Teams completed fifty-five projects and more still remains to be done. A second construction schedule has been made by the 5th Special Forces Group to continue to enlarge and improve the CIDG program. To support this construction program Group has requested continued engineer support from MACV for the next six months. This request has been approved and the new team are scheduled to arrive in country in August.

4. The major problem areas encountered by the teams have been in procuring equipment, moving the equipment which has been received, spare parts, and limited delays in the procurement and shipment of construction materials. Action has been taken to expedite shipment of equipment to the teams, more detail planning should eliminate the logistical problem, and the lead time for spare parts has been absorbed by the replaced teams. Detail planning should help to eliminate the problems encountered in movement of equipment. With these problems solved considerable progress can be shown in the future.

INCLOSURE 5 TO SECTION II to Operational Reprt on Lessons Learned (RCS 00000-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

# CONFIDENTIAL

## SUMMARY OF DELTA OPERATIONS

1. General: During the reporting period Project Delta worked as follows:

- a. Operational Days - 57
- b. Training Days - 35

2. Personnel:

a. By direction of CO, 5th SFGA, a TUCR has been submitted to meet the expanding requirements of Project Delta. Implementation of this TUCR will not only allow the US portion of Project Delta to parallel the current Vietnamese organization but will also allow the operation of a small capacity LRRP training school. This training school is currently being conducted by order of CG, COMUSMACV.

b. By order of CO, 5th SFGA, this unit's Recon Section is being maintained with a 20% overhead.

3. Training: The following training programs were conducted:

a. Refresher training for US/VN Recon Teams and the four Airborne Ranger Companies. This training ended with local operations in the Nha Trang area.

b. Newly assigned US/VN Delta personnel attended a 21 day Long Range Recon Patrol training program designed to prepare them for assignment with this unit's Recon Section. The course further served to eliminate those not having the mental and physical stamina needed to perform the Delta mission.

c. A total of 18 US personnel and 7 VN personnel from the 173d Abn Bde attended a 14 day LRRP training program.

d. A total of 33 personnel from the 25th Inf Div attended a 21 day LRRP training program.

e. A total of 11 personnel from the 1st Air Cav Div attended a 21 day LRRP training program.

f. A total of 26 VN CIDG personnel attended refresher airborne training and participated in small DZ airborne exercises.

4. Movement: All movements during the period were conducted by tactical aircraft with the only exception being one vehicular convoy.

5. Combat Operations:

a. Four reconnaissance operations were conducted. Recon Teams were committed to find targets, verify intelligence, and conduct tactical air strikes on, or guide reaction forces to targets discovered. Recon operations were as follows:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CORPS AREA</u>	<u>TEAM CONTROL</u>
6-66	05 May - 12 May	III	VN Team
7-66	23 May - 18 Jun	II	VN Team
8-66	25 Jun - 02 Jul	II	VN Team
9-66	15 Jul - 29 Jul	I	VN Team

INCLOSURE 6 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSMA-20 (R1)) 31 July 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

The USAF ALO/TAC Team flew 166 hours, conducted 9 air strikes, comprising 166 sorties in direct support of Delta Operations.

CG, 11th Air Force High Command redesignated the CIDG Roadrunner Teams, the LLDB Reconnaissance Commando Teams. (Short title LLDB Reconcondo Teams). The teams have the same general mission; infiltration into the areas of population and heavy trail nets outfitted as local Viet Cong. At present Project Delta has five deployable LLDB Reconcondo Teams.

6. Research and Development: A special panel review concerning special material requirements for this unit was held during the month of July. The findings of this panel were that the fourteen items currently required by this unit to better accomplish its current mission are now either in US Army Supply Channels or are currently being developed. Necessary items of equipment have been requisitioned under special authorization, reference letter this HQ dated 2 Aug 66, Subject: Letter of Justification(U). (Subject matter of letter classified SECRET).

7. Commander's Recommendations:

a. That Project Delta continue to be assigned missions at no lower than Corps level, assigned AOs by Corps, and have Corps assets available.

b. That Project Delta be issued the material items in the above referenced letter as soon as possible.

c. That Project Delta continue to be authorized a 20% overage in its Recon Section.

8. (U) Problem Areas and Recommendations: None.

ENCLOSURE 6 TO SECTION  
28 (R1) 31 July 1966

to Operational Report on Lessons Learned(RCS 00GPO-

CONFIDENTIAL

DETACHMENT A-502  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1st SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Dai Dien Four Development Program

THRU: Commanding Officer  
Detachment B-50  
ATTN: S-5  
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
APO US Forces 96240

1. General. This report covers the three (3) month period 1 May 1966 thru 31 July 1966. It is limited to the Dai Dien Four Area of Dien Khanh District and the progress made in the fields of civil affairs and psychological operations.

2. Approach. The initial step for development was to provide security. Since January 1966, this step has been fairly well accomplished. Starting in March, a survey of the civic action and psychological operations situation was conducted. Based on this survey of basic needs, desires and support available, a logical priority of projects was developed.

3. Local Government. Continued progress has been made in developing a sound working relationship with the District Chief. His improved cooperation has been very helpful. Village and hamlet officials are taking an active part in the development of the area. There has been some question as to the effectiveness of the Political Action Teams assigned to the Dai Dien villages. Although they have not been the complete solution, they have made a definite impact on the area and have contributed to the general development. You can seldom distinguish PAT personnel from the surrounding population. Therefore, a cursory glance may lead to the conclusion that they no longer operate in the area. However, they are working effectively. Accomplishments of the Political Action Teams are incorporated into other sections of this report.

ENCLOSURE 7 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966



SUBJECT: Success Story, Dai Dien Four Development Program

31 Jul 66

4. Health and Sanitation. The April survey showed an obvious need for improvements in both public and personal sanitation. Ulcerated sores, stomach cramps and diarrhea were common disorders. Continuous medical patrols and sanitation lectures have led to a marked decrease in sores and skin diseases and an improvement in the general health appearance of the children. The District Chief has selected fourteen villagers to attend the next Village Health Workers course in Nha Trang. Two dispensaries now operate in the area, one of which was opened with the assistance of PAT. The District Chief has hired two men to clean up the market on the approach to the Dai Dien bridge.

5. Education. Adequate schools and teachers are available. In January, all schools were closed. Prior to the end of the school year all schools were at least partially operational. This includes eleven (11) public and three (3) private schools. Several schools needed repairs and these were accomplished on a self-help basis during the vacation. The school damaged by terrorists was repaired immediately. School supplies and materials have been distributed. Materials for school furniture are being purchased with cost code 907 and revolving revolutionary development funds.

6. Agriculture. Maintaining security is the greatest aid to the agriculture program. The quantity and variety of crops raised is excellent. In July, the detachment acquired an 850 egg incubator. The baby chicks produced will be given to peasants to raise as a food supply and future breeding. The initial supply of eggs came from improved breeding stock in the United States. Thirty ducks are being raised by this detachment for breeding purposes. Presently we have 45 cows that were captured from the VC and brought here to fatten prior to shipping them as a meat source to Special Forces detachments in isolated areas of Vietnam. The Province Animal Husbandry Chief was called upon to solve the worm problem in hogs. The Group Veterinarian made an inspection trip in early July to check for any diseases in animals. As security improves the fruit orchards in the foothills will be accessible for harvest.

7. Welfare and Refugees. There is no refugee problem in the Dai Dien Four area. Indemnification payments have been made to some but not all families with damaged homes. Many homes show evidence of recent repair work.

8. Transportation. Improved transportation facilities were considered to be one of the greatest needs in the April survey. It is in this field that the greatest progress has been made.

a. Every hamlet now has at least one main road which has been graded and ditched. The local population under direction of their hamlet Chief finished the roads and ditches after the rough work was done by road graders. Commercial transportation has moved into the area. Buses run twice daily from Dai Dien to Nha Trang. Tri-Lambrotas interconnect the hamlets and Dien Khanh.

SUBJECT: Success Story, Dai Dien Four Development Program

31 Jul

b. The PAT in Dai Dien Phu assisted the villagers in constructing a one meter wide, 65 foot long bridge across the tributary of the Song Cai River. Prior to this construction, 3/4 of the hamlet was isolated from the Dai Dien Four area. The village Chief estimates that 6,000 people use this simple bamboo bridge daily. Plans are being made by USAID engineers to build a permanent vehicular bridge. In the meantime villagers and PAT are busily preparing pilings.

c. The main bridge across the Song Cai River from Dien Khanh to Dai Dien has been considered a major problem since the re-opening of the area. A US Engineer Company has just completed placing metal decking and metal supports on the bridge. Access roads have been raised and the decking of the bridge was raised 5 feet. Recent rains have so completely flooded the area that it is doubtful if the bridge could have been used without the improvements made.

9. Commercial Development. Commercial development has progressed in direct relation to security. All old stores and several new stores have been opened. Two blacksmith shops have recently been opened.

10. Resources Control. Both PF and PAT are active in enforcing the 2000 hour to 0600 hour curfew. PAT personnel have moved from the Dien Thuy area to more outlying villages. There is a National Police Representative (Deputy Hamlet Chief for Youth and Security) in each hamlet. Upon recommendation of the CA/PSYOP Officer, the District Chief has implemented the family census book. Books have been completed for Phu Loc. Once the books for a particular hamlet are complete, raids are conducted to detect any extra or missing persons.

11. Psychological Operations. The District VIS is fairly active within Dien Khanh. In the Dai Dien Four area, Assistant Hamlet Chiefs for Propaganda have displayed many pro-GVN posters and health information posters. The PAT has put up many posters and held group discussions concerning the GVN.

12. Summary. There has been a very obvious re-development of the Dai Dien Four area. The homes are all re-occupied and as the farmers prepare for a new season, land which has remained unused for several seasons is being replanted. New crops and livestock are apparent throughout the area. The population has boomed, and along with it village and hamlet officials are accepting more of their duties and responsibilities. There is little evidence that this area was ever contested. The greatest improvements have been in the area of transportation facilities. Fourteen schools have been re-opened. Pagodas and Catholic Churches have been re-built. The overall impression of the area is that of prosperity and contentment.

3

ENCLOSURE 7 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CSGPG-20 (R1)) 31 July 1966

DETACHMENT A-109  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96337

27 July 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Thuong Duc

THRU: Commanding Officer  
Detachment C-1, 5th SFGA  
ATTN: S-5  
APO US Forces 96337

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
APO US Forces 96240

1. General:

a. Operation MEDSTRAC was conducted at Det A-109, Thuong Duc, 22-24 June. The purpose of this combined CA/PSYOP-Medical operation was to extend the area of influence of the GVN in the Thuong Duc area by providing much needed medical treatment, food supplies and selected propaganda to the population in the A-109 operational area.

b. The following Military units and civilian agencies participated: Det C-1, Det A-109, 5th SFGA; Det A-153 LLDB; Det 16, 41st CA Co; 244th PSYOP Co; Public Health Division USAID; VIS; US Navy; RVN National Police; and International Rescue Service.

2. Sequence of Events:

a. Six days prior to the operation, medical and CA supplies were assembled at Detachment C-1 for shipment. Supplies for 5,000 people were assembled, with a reserve for an additional 3,000 people remaining at Det C-1.

b. A two-man PSYOP team from the 244th PSYOP Co arrived at Det A-109 and began broadcasting loudspeaker messages and showing public health movies.

c. During the next two days necessary supplies were moved into the detachment area, along with a number of pre-planned leaflets for hand distribution and airdrop.

ENCLOSURE 8 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Thuong Duc (cont)

27 Jul 66

d. The day preceding the operation most of the personnel to participate arrived at Thuong Duc. They included: Dr. William Grimsloy, Public Health Director, USAID Region I; Lt (USN) William Adams, 3rd MAF Surgeon; and Captain Donald Lucas, C-1 Surgeon plus medical personnel from Detachment C-1. A Navy lab technician was also in the group with a portable field lab.

e. On 22 June in a field at the edge of the district town of Thuong Duc in three large tents made from cargo parachutes, the operation began. Prior to commencement of treatment, the district chief made a short speech explaining the purpose of MEDSTRAC and asking for full cooperation of local residents.

f. During the morning loudspeaker aircraft flew the entire area announcing the event.

g. At the entrance to the treatment area, which was cordoned off for control purposes, the team medics from A-109, along with the CIDG medics and an interpreter, examined the local residents and sent them to one of the three tents for treatment.

h. They sent the most seriously ill to the first tent where the three doctors, a medical assistant, and two interpreters worked.

i. In the second tent, medics from C-1 and the 41st CA Co, treated minor ills and dispensed medicine as prescribed by the doctors. Here also the Group Dental Surgeon worked. During the three days he pulled more than 500 teeth. The portable lab was also in the area.

j. CA/PSYOP supplies, including bulgar wheat, candy, leaflets and comic books, were distributed in the third tent. Also in a corner of this tent, each person was interviewed by intelligence personnel.

k. The Operation continued in this manner for the three days. On the final day at 0215 an estimated company of VC mortared Camp Thuong Duc and attacked an FOB. They adjusted mortar rounds to within 13 paces of either end of the tent where CA and medical personnel were billeted. Friendly casualties were light, but 8 VC were killed and 5 wounded near the FOB. As an interesting sidelight, candy that had been given out during MEDSTRAC was found in the pockets of some of the dead VC.

l. Following the three days of the initial phase of MEDSTRAC, A-109 medics with their LLDB and CIDG counterparts continued medical treatments on a regular basis concurrently with long-range CA projects.

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Thuong Duc (cont)

27 Jul 66

3. Summary:

During the three days over 2,100 villagers were treated. Desire to come under government control was exhibited in that the VC issued warnings for local inhabitants to stay away from the clinic. Crowds were larger the last day of the operation, even after the VC had mortared the treatment area early the same morning. Thuong Duc has taken a giant step towards GVN control.

4. Conclusions:

Operations of this type can be invaluable if well planned and executed. Using the combined resources of military and civilian agencies leads to increasingly greater cooperation and more effective treatment. Even greater emphasis should be placed on GVN participation in future operations of this type.

s/Robert G. Heuver  
t/ROBERT G. HEUVER  
Captain, QMC  
CC, Det A-109

3

ENCLOSURE 8 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

## OPERATION BLUE STAR

Operation "Blue Star", a recovery and burial operation of casualties during the battle of Camp A Chau (YC 494834), was initiated on 18 May 1966 consisting of 31 USASF from Det C-1, Da Nang. Under the command of LTC Facey, C Det Commander, the Special Forces troops were helilifted by 7 H-24 and 2 HU-1B helicopters provided by the 163d US Marine Helicopter Squadron from Hue Phu Bai to Camp A Chau. Approximately thirty-two minutes were spent on the ground clearing the area of booby traps, burying the remains of indigenous personnel and retrieving the remains of the 5 USASF killed during the battle. This operation resulted in the recovery of the remains of 4 USASF and the burial of 24 indigenous personnel found in the open. An intense ground search was conducted to locate the remains of the remaining USASF soldier but to no avail. Only scattered enemy groundfire was received during the return flight to Hue/Phu Bai which put one or two holes into the aircraft with no damage or casualties. Operation Blue Star was successful in that it was accomplished proficiently and without the loss of additional lives.

INCLOSURE 9 TO SECTION XI to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966.

### CIDG PARTICIPATION IN "OPERATION NATHAN HALE"

The coordination and effectiveness of Joint Operations involving CIDG troops and conventional units are described in this operation.

The 254th CIDG Company, from Camp Dong Tre, A-222, Phu Yen Province, while performing a routine road security mission between the La Hai FOB and Dong Tre was overrun. On 180230 June, a Viet Cong Battalion attacked and overran the 254th CIDG Company, which was occupying three outposts vicinity B9923745. Friendly Forces, although sustaining heavy casualties during the assault and subsequent withdrawal, killed ten VC and captured three AK-47 assault rifles, one M-2 carbine, two G43 carbines, and several hand grenades. At first light, A-222 dispatched a relief force into the area, contact was made on 180815 June at the Outpost with an estimated ninety VC. An airstrike, called upon the position by the friendly patrol, forced the enemy to flee in disorder. Tactical aircraft continued to deliver ordnance on targets and suspected enemy locations throughout the area. In order to exploit the tactical situation developed through CIDG efforts and react to the intelligence thus gained, elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st Air Cavalry Divisions arrived at Dong Tre for subsequent deployment. On 23 June, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division were helilifted into vic 920070, where they were immediately engaged by units of the 18-B North Vietnamese Regiment. As a result of the fierce fighting which had developed, the entire battalion was deployed in support of the companies in contact. These units in turn were reinforced by four battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division, CIDG Companies from Dong Tre, the Mike Force from Pleiku, and Delta Recon Groups. Light to heavy contact had been maintained. In an attempt to find, fix and destroy the NVA forces, which threatened Dong Tre and its surrounding area, the 1st Air Cavalry Division deployed an additional Brigade to the Dong Tre area, thus dubbing the entire endeavor "Operation Nathan Hale". USASF advised CIDG participation in this operation, as well as all joint operations with conventional units, included small range Apache Recon Patrols, Security Platoons, Long Range Recon Patrols, Special Patrols and Company size Patrols. On 26 June, following the detection of a Viet Cong buildup in Phu Yen Province, Detachment B-22 moved a Forward CP element to Tuy Hoa to co-locate with the Forward CP of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), maintaining formal liaison with them. From this posture the B Detachment Commander controlled "A" Detachments at Phu Luc, Cung Son, Dong Tre and Van Canh, and one company of the Mike Force while conducting joint operations with the first Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division. The size and mission of the CIDG were as follows: one company of the Mike Force (177 CIDG and 5 USASF) conducted saturation patrols in the Kyo Valley; three CIDG companies with 7 USASF conducted screening missions, additional CIDG from Dong Tre provided artillery security conducted Apache Recon Patrols; Camp Cung Son provided one company for road security and provided a perimeter for an Artillery Battery. Twelve Delta Recon Teams were also employed on Long Range Reconnaissance patrols, which were very effective in locating large VC/NVA movements, and in which case conventional forces were notified and employed in the areas. On 30 June, ten

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Special advisers of Project Delta with one Airborne Ranger Company conducted an air assault in the vicinity of 0905825, continuing on with the mission to search and sweep southwest and to locate a reported enemy force consisting of three companies plus some one hundred workers. "Operation Kathan Hale" began on 6 July with a total of three hundred and thirteen VC/VA confirmed killed, an additional two hundred and sixteen estimated as having been killed by tactical Air and Artillery. One hundred were wounded, twenty captured, forty-one suspects detained and one hundred and forty-one weapons were captured in action.

"Operation Kathan Hale" not only proved to be a tactically successful operation, but also demonstrated the effectiveness of close relationships, coordination and deployment of CIDG troops with conventional forces.



## VC Buildup in Binh Long Province

III Corps activity for this period centered in Binh Long Province. Intelligence nets, interrogation of captured VC, and captured VC documents indicated that the VC would concentrate its Monsoon Campaign in the province. On 3 May a CIDG company on an operation east of Loc Ninh (XU72507) camp made contact with a VC company size unit, resulting in an one hour fire fight, in the vicinity of of XU01007. During the encounter certain documents were captured indicating that the VC would attack Loc Ninh CIDG camp and District Headquarters immediately following reconnaissance missions, scheduled to be conducted 8-9-10 May. Other documents captured proved to be an intelligence estimate of the Loc Ninh area to include a VC plan of attack. Generally the plan of attack called for the employment of four regiments, one of which would be reinforced with 8 anti-aircraft guns for the final attack of the objective. The regiments were identified as Q762, Q763, and the 101st Regiment of the 35th Division. The fourth was later identified as the Q761. Objectives outlined in the document included target A-1 alleged to be the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp and target A-2, the Loc Ninh District Headquarters and air strip. Each target was to be attacked by one regiment. The third and fourth regiments assigned missions were to cut highway 13 to preclude reinforcement, and to area ambush the highway and landing zones to prevent possible reinforcement by helicopter operations. One of the regiments would also function as a reaction force. In reaction to what was considered to be valid intelligence of an impending attack, the Multi-Purpose Reaction (MIKE) force with a strength of 441 troops was airlifted to Loc Ninh on 6 May to reinforce and improve the defensive posture of the camp, secure the airfield, and to conduct limited operations to seek out VC units operating in the area. On 8 May the 5th ARVN Division reinforced the area with the 9th ARVN Regiment. Numerous contacts were made by the MIKE force and CIDG units with small VC elements and signs of extensive activity was noted but no major contact was made until 17 May 66. The contact was made near the Cambodian border vicinity XU5803 by the MIKE force and one company of CIDG. The contact was with a superior force. The MIKE force and CIDG company were forced to break contact and withdraw. On 19 May 66 the 1st US Infantry Division reinforced Loc Ninh with the 1st Brigade. The 1st US Infantry Division troops conducted extensive operations but were unable to make any significant contact. They were extracted from the area on 25 May. The VC immediately increased their activities and indications were that they would carry out their original mission even though their plans had been compromised. Based on the indications of VC continuation on their plans the 1st US Infantry Division returned to Binh Long Province in strength in early June. Their mission was to secure and defend critical installations and to conduct operations to locate and destroy the four VC Regiments reported in the province. Since that time there has been numerous contacts and three major battles have been fought with the VC. Body count of VC killed on 31 July was 1338.

ENCLOSURE 11 TO SECTION II to Operations Reprt on Lessons Learned (RCS-CSC, O-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966.

## Opening of Camp Trai Bi, Tay Ninh Province

On 22 Jun 66 the MIA force made a heliborne assault on Trai Bi (AT115702), Tay Ninh Province, in preparation for the opening of a new CIDG camp there. The MF met no resistance on the ground during the initial assault. The A Detachment along with five CIDG companies, the 35th ARVN Ranger Battalion, and a company of ARVN Engineers travelled by convoy from Trang Sup (AT166555), Tay Ninh Province, up highway 22 and closed into the proposed camp site without incident on 23 June.

Extensive use of the area by Viet Cong is apparent due to the extensive fortified base areas and tunnels discovered. There have been two major encounters with the VC. The first involved an operation which a 1st force company was conducting approximately four kilometers north of the camp. At 041400 an estimated VC battalion was engaged. Due to the superior fire power of the VC battalion the 1st company was forced to withdraw. A second 1st company was committed to reinforce but due to the dense jungle growth they were unable to deploy into a position where fire superiority could be gained. Both companies withdrew under cover of 4.2 Air and 105mm Arty support. A combined operation utilizing the 1st and the 35th Ranger Battalion was later conducted in the area in an attempt to locate and destroy the VC, however contact could not be regained. The second major action was a VC initiated artillery attack against the camp location. VC forces began shelling the camp with 70mm Pack Howitzers at 232320 July. Approximately 130 rounds were fired. Damage was not extensive, and the VC did not follow up the barrage with an assault. The rapid deployment of a PAC and a flareship along with counter mortar fire may have interrupted plans for an infantry attack. As of 31 July the construction of the Camp is approximately fifty percent complete.

INC ODD 12 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSCPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

1. General Situation: Intelligence reports received on 7 May, indicated that a VC meeting had taken place on 24 April to discuss and formulate plans for attacks against outposts in An Phu district, Chau Doc Province, during the rainy season. Participants in the meeting consisted of the Chau Doc Province Commissioner, An Phu District Commissioner, 364th VC Battalion Commander (AKA 521st Bn), and the 264th VC Battalion Commander (AKA 261st Bn). Intelligence reports continued, indicating that an attack would occur in the immediate future. On 18 May current intelligence strongly indicated that two VC battalions, the 364th and 261st, would attack CIDG FOB's and PF outposts at Khanh-An, Rhon-Hoi, Phu Huu and Don Ki that night. Based on this accumulation of intelligence, all CIDG and PF units in the area were placed on a 100% alert. An ambush force, consisting of one platoon CIDG, 1 platoon PF, 1 VMSF and 2 USASF, was dispatched to guard a vital bridge along the main supply routes to the FOB's and OP's, and also to act as the initial reaction force for units in the northern portion of the district in the event of a VC attack.

2. Concept of Operation:

a. At 0325 hours on 19 May, the 261st VC battalion reinforced by the 367th VC battalion with an estimated strength of 700, launched an attack against the CIDG company at Khanh Binh and completely surrounded their position. The VC force employed 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launcher, LMG and small arms fire, and conducted "Human Wave" type assaults every 15-20 minutes. Simultaneously the PF outpost at Khanh An, manned by a platoon of PF and the reconnaissance platoon from camp An Phu, came under attack by an estimated force of 200 VC from the 512th VC battalion. The 512th Bn employed 81mm mortar, 57mm Recoilless rifle, LMG and small arms fire during the assault. Anti-aircraft guns were also employed upon the arrival of a "Puff" ship over the area. At 0330 hours, the ambush force at the bridge site ambushed a VC demolition squad attempting to blow the bridge. At 0340 hours on the 19th, the PF outposts at Khanh Binh, Phu Huu, Rhon Hoi, and Don Ki came under harassing small arms fire, which continued for approximately two hours at each location.

b. At 0515 hours, a reaction force of 3 platoons CIDG, 2 VMSF, 1 USASF and the VC Camp Commander departed An Phu, linked up with the ambush party at the bridge then proceeded to Khanh Binh to relieve the pressure on the surrounded CIDG company. By the time the reaction force reached Khanh Binh, at 0700 hours, the VC had penetrated and were occupying 10 meters of the outer perimeter defensive trench. Effective heavy fire was placed on the VC lines by the reaction force, forcing the VC to withdraw from Khanh Binh into Cambodia. From their sanctuary in Cambodia the VC continued to place 81mm mortar and LMG fire on the CIDG positions until 1030 hours. At 1100 hours, the VC broke off the attack on the Khanh An OP and withdrew north approximately 2 kilometers.

c. On 20 May at 0300 hours, a company of VC launched a second attack against the PF OP at Khanh An. The OP at this time was being supported by a company of Regional Force troops, causing the VC to be unsuccessful in their attack which they broke off at 0320 hours. A second attack against the CIDG company (now reinforced) at Khanh Binh was initiated

by an estimated 500 VC at 0130 hours on 20 May. A second reaction force consisting of 3 platoons of CIDG, 2 VNSF and 2 USASF departed An Phu at 0500 hours. An 81mm mortar, manned by 2 VNSF and 2 CIDG, was set up approximately 1800 meters from the battle area to give supporting fire while the remainder of the reaction force moved into contact with the VC who had once again surrounded the CIDG positions at Khanh Binh. The VC broke contact at 0600 hours and once again withdrew into Cambodia. At 0700 hours, the CIDG company was withdrawn from Khanh Binh and replaced with a company of fresh troops. Although the VC had withdrawn from the CIDG positions at Khanh Binh, the PF OP, 2 kilometers north, was still surrounded and receiving harassing fire. A relief operation for the OP was requested from Province headquarters, but was not approved. However, a CIDG force moved to the OP and cleared the immediate area.

d. A third attack was launched against the CIDG post at Khanh Binh by an estimated 200 VC at 2045 hours, 20 May. This assault was limited to MG and small arms fire which indicated that the VC had spent their crew served weapon ammunition or were preparing for a large scale assault. A flare ship and a gun ship arrived over the area approximately 25 minutes later giving illumination and fire support. Under heavy suppressing fire from the "Puff" ship, the VC were forced to withdraw, limiting their actions to the south side of the CIDG positions until finally breaking off the attack at 0300 hours on 21 May.

e. On 21 May, a temporary FOB was established at the Don Ki IF outpost, consisting of 1 platoon of PF and 2 USASF. An 81mm mortar was mounted, with the capability of supporting both Khanh Binh and Khanh An. At 2020 hours the VC launched a fourth attack against the CIDG company at Khanh Binh with an estimated strength of 200. A "puff" ship arrived over the area at 2200 hours, providing illumination and fire support, but was greatly hampered by .50 caliber MG fire from a Cambodian outpost approximately 2 kilometers from Khanh Binh. The VC broke off the attack at 2210 hours, but continued to harass the CIDG positions with 81mm mortar fire until 2345 hours.

f. A fifth attack against the CIDG at Khanh Binh was launched at 2030 hours on 22 May by an estimated 200 VC, supported by 60mm mortar and MG fire. The CIDG forces were supported by 81mm mortar fire from the temporary FOB at Don Ki and 155mm howitzer fire from An Phu. The VC attack was broken up and they were forced to withdraw at 2110 hours.

g. On 24 May, a multi company search and destroy mission was mounted to clear the VC from the area thus preventing them from gaining a foothold. Friendly elements consisted of 1 company Mike Force, 1 company of KKK, 1 company of CIDG, 2 VNSF and 2 USASF. The operation was initiated with 155mm howitzer and 81mm mortar concentrations being fired into the area. Upon entering the operational area the Mike Force established heavy contact with the VC at 0910 hours. An airstrike was received at 1035 hours, covering the area with rockets, napalm and strafing runs in close support of the attacking ground forces. At 1325 hours, contact with the VC was lost and the operation was terminated.

h. Throughout the entire period of 19-24 May, CIDG and PF forces in the northern half of An Phu district were in continual contact with the VC.

ENCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966

### 3. Conclusion:

a. The intelligence net employed in An Phu district was a well organized and highly effective force, providing extremely accurate information in a timely manner.

b. The CIDG and PF forces maintained a high state of morale and fighting effectiveness throughout the period and defended their positions in an outstanding manner.

c. Had the ambush party not been sent to the bridge site on the night of 18 May, the VC would have successfully destroyed the bridge, causing a lengthy delay in the reaction forces reaching the battle area which could have resulted in a decisive victory for the VC.

d. Air support that was received was exceptionally well executed and proved highly instrumental in the defense of the FOB and OP's, however air support was lacking in quantity as indicated below:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>DISAPPROVED</u>
Flare Ship	3	2	1
Gun Ships (Helicopter)	2	1	1
TAC Air	2	1	1
RED EVAC	4	1 (US)	3
TOTAL:	11	5	6

ENCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS  
CGPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966.

## CONTINGENCY PLANS THE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS IN I CORP

US Army Special Forces camps are located in five of the provinces of I CTZ. They are situated in areas of limited visibility and low cloud cover. The adverse weather situation worsens during the Autumnal Monsoon season, and the campsites are surrounded by dense jungle growth and steep mountains. Prior to the employment of US Forces in I Corps the CIDG forces conducted unilateral operations only. In most cases CIDG units were the only government influence in the area.

During the past year, and particularly during the past quarter, VC infiltration from North Vietnam has become a cause for concern. To counter the potential threat this buildup poses to Special Forces camps contingency plans have been formulated to strengthen their defensive posture and enhance their operational capability. The battle of A Shau on 9-10 February confirmed the necessity for flexible support capability for camps imminently in danger of or actually under attack, even in poor weather.

The I Corps Senior Advisor (CG III MAF) and detachment commander, C-1 jointly developed a responsive system for relieving camps under heavy pressure from Viet Cong/NVA forces. This system includes the rapid deployment of Airmobile artillery, direct air/ground communications with supporting aircraft, direct communications with F-4E forces, and the use of Sky Spot bombing techniques.

ENCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS 28GPO-28 (R1)) 31 July 1966.